The psychology of emotion regulation: An integrative review by Koole, S.L.
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam]
On: 25 November 2010
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 923160581]
Publisher Psychology Press
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Cognition & Emotion
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713682755
The psychology of emotion regulation: An integrative review
Sander L. Koolea
a V University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
To cite this Article Koole, Sander L.(2009) 'The psychology of emotion regulation: An integrative review', Cognition &
Emotion, 23: 1, 4 — 41
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02699930802619031
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699930802619031
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
The psychology of emotion regulation:
An integrative review
Sander L. Koole
V University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
The present article reviews modern research on the psychology of emotion
regulation. Emotion regulation determines the offset of emotional responding
and is thus distinct from emotional sensitivity, which determines the onset of
emotional responding. Among the most viable categories for classifying emotion-
regulation strategies are the targets and functions of emotion regulation. The
emotion-generating systems that are targeted in emotion regulation include
attention, knowledge, and bodily responses. The functions of emotion regulation
include satisfying hedonic needs, supporting specific goal pursuits, and facilitating
the global personality system. Emotion-regulation strategies are classified in terms
of their targets and functions and relevant empirical work is reviewed. Throughout
this review, emotion regulation emerges as one of the most far-ranging and
influential processes at the interface of cognition and emotion.
Keywords: Emotion regulation; Affect regulation; Self-regulation; Coping;
Psychological defence.
Emotions are often portrayed as irresistible forces that exert a sweeping
influence on behaviour. There is reason to believe, however, that people are
much more flexible in dealing with their emotions. As it turns out, people
can control virtually every aspect of emotional processing, including how
emotion directs attention (Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008), the
cognitive appraisals that shape emotional experience (Gross, 1998a), and
the physiological consequences of emotion (Porges, 2007). These and other
processes whereby people manage their own emotions are commonly
referred to as emotion regulation. Emotion regulation has been linked to
such important outcomes as mental health (Gross & Mun˜oz, 1995), physical
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health (Sapolsky, 2007), relationship satisfaction (Murray, 2005), and work
performance (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000). It thus seems vital to
learn more about the psychology of emotion regulation.
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of emotion-regulation
research (see Gross, 2007, for a comprehensive overview). Indeed, since
the last review on this topic was published in Cognition and Emotion (Gross,
1999), more than 700 journal articles appeared with the term ‘‘emotion
regulation’’ in the title or abstract, according to the PsycInfo database. The
number of relevant publications becomes several times greater if one
considers work on closely related topics such as mood regulation, affect
regulation, and coping. The tremendous increase in research volume has
rendered the study of emotion regulation one of the most vibrant areas in
contemporary psychology. At the same time, it has become increasingly
important to integrate the rapidly accumulating findings and insights. The
need for integration is further enhanced by the multidisciplinary nature of
emotion regulation research, which spans developmental, cognitive, social,
personality, and clinical psychology, and, more recently, cognitive and
affective neurosciences and psychophysiology.
The present article provides an integrative review of contemporary
research on the psychology of emotion regulation. The relevant literature
is too large to be covered exhaustively. Consequently, the present article gives
priority to ideas and findings with broad implications for the psychology of
emotion regulation. Because the development and disorders of emotion
regulation have been reviewed elsewhere (Kring & Werner, 2004; Skinner &
Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002; Taylor &
Liberzon, 2007), the present article concentrates on emotion regulation
among healthy adults. In the following paragraphs, I first consider more
closely what emotion regulation is and how it relates to other forms of
emotion processing. Next, I discuss several approaches to classifying
strategies of emotion regulation and review empirical research on emo-
tion-regulation strategies. Finally, I summarise the main conclusions of the
present article and suggest avenues for future research on emotion
regulation.
WHAT IS EMOTION REGULATION?
In everyday life, people are continually exposed to potentially emotion-
arousing stimuli, ranging from internal sensations like an upset stomach to
external events such as juicy gossip about a colleague or music played in
supermarkets. From the fact that these kinds of stimuli only occasionally
trigger full-blown emotions, one could infer that people engage in some form
of emotion regulation almost all of the time (Davidson, 1998). But emotion
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regulation may also become manifested in more overt ways. For instance,
there are reliable observations that people may rapidly shift their attention
away from threatening stimuli (Langens & Mo¨rth, 2003), that people may
overcome traumatic experiences by writing about them (Pennebaker &
Chung, 2007), and that people may choose to hit a pillow instead of lashing
out at the true cause of their anger (Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001).
In each of the aforementioned cases, people resist being carried away or
‘‘hijacked’’ (Goleman, 1995) by the immediate emotional impact of the
situation. Emotion regulation can thus be defined as the set of processes
whereby people seek to redirect the spontaneous flow of their emotions.
Some approaches have also considered emotion regulation by the external
environment. For instance, developmental research indicates that caregivers
may play a key role in regulating children’s emotional states (Southam-
Gerow & Kandell, 2002) and environmental research has shown that natural
settings can promote more rapid recovery from stress than urban settings
(Van den Berg, Hartig, & Staats, 2007). Emotion regulation by forces outside
the self is clearly important. Nevertheless, following the predominant focus
of the literature (Gross, 2007), the present article concentrates on the self-
regulation of emotion.
The prototype of emotion regulation is a deliberate, effortful process that
seeks to override people’s spontaneous emotional responses. Some forms of
emotion regulation indeed fit this prototype, by drawing upon the same
psychological and neurobiological systems that are involved in the effortful
control of action and attention (Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008; Tice &
Bratslavsky, 2000). However, other forms of emotion regulation are relatively
automatic and effortless (Bargh & Williams, 2007; Koole & Kuhl, 2007;
Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Furthermore, emotion regulation does not
always consist of an overriding process, in as far as this implies an
antagonistic stance towards one’s emotions. Indeed, some sophisticated
forms of emotion regulation unfold in close collaboration with other types of
emotion processing (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Pennebaker & Chung,
2007; Porges, 2007).
During emotion regulation, people may increase, maintain, or decrease
positive and negative emotions. Accordingly, emotion regulation often
involves changes in emotional responding. These changes may occur in the
kinds of emotions that people have, when they have their emotions, and how
they experience and express their emotions (Gross, 1999). Notably, the
emotional changes that are produced by emotion regulation may or may not
bring people closer to the emotional state that they desired. Indeed, some
forms of emotion regulation ironically bring about the very emotional
outcomes that people hope to avoid (e.g., Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993).
Emotion regulation may also fail in other ways, such that people may still
display unwanted emotions despite their best efforts to avoid them. When
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people are chronically unable to regulate their emotions, this may seriously
disrupt psychological functioning. Indeed, chronic deficits in emotion
regulation contribute to all major forms of psychopathology (Bradley,
2000; Kring & Werner, 2004).
The scope of emotion regulation
Emotions have multiple components, consisting of a more or less coherent
cluster of valenced (i.e., positive or negative) behavioural and physiological
responses that are accompanied by specific thoughts and feelings (Cacioppo,
Berntson, & Klein, 1992; Frijda, 2006; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter,
Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Because emotion regulation operates on people’s
emotions, it follows that the effects of emotion regulation can be observed
across all modalities of emotional responding, including behaviour, physiol-
ogy, thoughts, and feelings.
According to some classic theories of emotion, each emotion triggers a
discrete pattern of behaviour, physiology, thoughts, and feelings. However,
the available evidence does not support the existence of discrete emotional
states (Mauss & Robinson, in press; Russell, 2003). Instead, emotional
responding appears to be organised in terms of a few fundamental
dimensions, including valence, arousal, and approachavoidance. The
influence of emotion regulation on people’s emotional states is therefore
likely to be similarly dimensional. In other words, emotion regulation may
not be so much concerned with getting people in or out of discrete emotional
states like anger, sadness, or joy. Rather, emotion regulation may change
people’s emotional states along dimensions such as valence, arousal, and
approachavoidance.
Closely related to emotion regulation are constructs such as mood
regulation, coping with stress, and affect regulation. Although it is possible
to distinguish semantically between these constructs, their substantive
overlap is considerable. At the heart of all emotional states is core affect
(Russell, 2003), basic states of feeling good or bad, energised or enervated.
The regulation of specific emotions, moods, stress, and diffuse affect is
therefore always aimed at changing core affect. Moreover, the empirical
borders between these different emotion constructs are very fuzzy (Russell,
2003). In view of these considerations, it seems most productive to conceive
of emotion regulation broadly, as relating to the management of all
emotionally charged states, including discrete emotions, mood, stress, and
affect. Ultimately, it may be possible to derive more fine-grained distinctions
between different types of emotional states that are being regulated. At
present, however, a broad conception of emotion regulation offers the best
promise of uncovering the basic principles that underlie various emotion-
regulatory activities.
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Emotion regulation versus emotional sensitivity
A longstanding issue is the distinction between emotion regulation and other
forms of emotion processing. One seemingly straightforward approach
would be to observe the differences between regulated and unregulated
emotions. Unfortunately, this comparison is often difficult to make. People
can regulate their emotions very rapidly (Jostmann, Koole, Van der Wulp, &
Fockenberg, 2005; Rothermund et al., 2008). It is therefore often unclear
‘‘where an emotion ends and regulation begins’’ (Davidson, 1998, p. 308).
A conceptual solution to this problem lies in the temporal unfolding of an
emotional response (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2007; Davidson, Jackson,
& Kalin, 2000; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007). As it turns out, people’s
primary emotional response to the situation can be qualitatively different
from their secondary emotional response*see also Lazarus’ (1991) distinc-
tion between primary versus secondary appraisals. People’s primary emo-
tional response presumably reflects their emotional sensitivity, whereas their
secondary emotional response presumably reflects emotion regulation. This
distinction is grounded in the conceptualisation of emotion regulation as a
control process. Control processes, as they are commonly understood,
consist of the monitoring and adjusting of a lower-level process with respect
to a given standard (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Applied to emotion regulation,
this implies that an unwanted emotional response must occur initially before
any emotion regulation can take place. Although people’s primary emotional
response is not yet regulated, it serves as vital input for the subsequent
monitoring and control processes that constitute emotion regulation.
To illustrate the distinction between emotional sensitivity and emotion
regulation, Figure 1 displays the development of an emotional response over
time (after Kuhl, 2008). To simplify matters, the figure only shows a single
emotional response with a single maximum strength. Emotional sensitivity is
represented by the entry gradient, or the steepness with which the emotional
Down-regulation
Time
Up-regulation
Primary reaction Secondary reaction
High sensitivity
Low sensitivity
Emotional 
response
Figure 1. Model of emotional sensitivity versus emotion regulation.
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response reaches its full force. Emotional sensitivity is determined by any
variable that influences people’s initial emotional response to the situation,
including the nature of the stimuli that people encounter, personal character-
istics, and the broader situation. The offset of the emotional response is
depicted in Figure 1 as the exit gradient, or the steepness with which the
emotional response returns to a neutral baseline. Variables that influence the
exit gradient belong to the process of emotion regulation. Similar to emotional
sensitivity, emotion regulation is determined by the characteristics of the
person, the stimuli that the person encounters, and the broader situation.
Down-regulation processes aim to achieve a steeper exit gradient,
resulting in a speedier return to the baseline (e.g., Gross, 1998a). By
contrast, maintenance processes aim to achieve a flatter exit gradient, such
that the emotional response is maintained over a longer period of time (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Up-regulation processes may even increase the
magnitude of the emotion response, for instance, when people engage in
response exaggeration (Schmeichel, Demaree, Robinson, & Pu, 2006).
Emotion regulation may also influence aspects of emotion processing
besides the exit gradient, such as the coherence, intensity, awareness, and
goal-directedness of emotional responses. Nevertheless, it is the impact on
the exit gradient of an emotional response that sets emotion regulation apart
from other types of emotion processing.
Distinguishing between emotional sensitivity and emotion regulation is
relatively straightforward when people are engaged in the on-line regulation
of their emotions. However, some forms of emotion regulation occur
proactively, for instance, when people avoid an upcoming situation that is
expected to elicit an undesired emotion (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997;
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). In such cases, emotion regulation subjectively
precedes the onset of emotion. Indeed, to the extent that proactive coping is
successful, people may never experience any unwanted emotion at all.
However, studies have shown that anticipating an emotional experience leads
to a partial simulation of that experience, in which emotional responses of
the brain and body become activated (Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Therefore emotional
sensitivity already comes into play during the anticipation of unwanted
emotions. The distinction between emotional sensitivity and emotion
regulation is therefore meaningful regardless of whether people regulate
their emotions on line, in the heat of the moment, or proactively, before an
emotion-arousing situation has actually occurred.
Separate contributions of emotional sensitivity and emotion regulation
have been observed throughout the lifespan. Infants and young children
display inborn physiological differences that relate to emotional sensitivity,
whereas other physiological differences relate to children’s ability to regulate
their emotional responses (Derryberry, Reed, & Pilkenton-Taylor, 2003;
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Eisenberg, Fabes, & Guthrie, 1997; Rothbart, Derryberry, & Posner, 1994).
Emotion sensitivity follows an intrinsic path of development that is largely
independent of environmental influences and changes less as people grow
older (McCrae et al., 2000; Terracciano, Costa, & McCrae, 2005). By
contrast, competencies at emotion regulation are strongly influenced by the
quality of children’s social interactions with their caregivers (Mikulincer,
Shaver, & Pereg, 2003; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002) and continue to
improve even into old age (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003; Gro¨pel,
Kuhl, & Kaze´n, 2004; John & Gross, 2004). Across the lifespan, traits related
to emotion regulation and traits related to emotional reactivity interact in
predicting psychological functioning (Baumann et al., 2007; Davidson, 1998;
Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007).
Summary
Emotion regulation consists of people’s active attempts to manage their
emotional states. In its broadest sense, emotion regulation subsumes the
regulation of all states that are emotionally charged, including moods, stress,
and positive or negative affect. Emotion regulation determines the offset of
an emotional response, and can thus be distinguished from emotional
sensitivity, which determines the onset of an emotional response. Emotional
sensitivity and emotion regulation follow different developmental paths and
are functionally distinct throughout the lifespan.
CLASSIFYING EMOTION-REGULATION STRATEGIES
Emotion-regulation strategies refer to the concrete approach that people take
in managing their emotions. For instance, after a romantic break-up, people
may focus their attention on a neutral activity (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007),
cognitively reframe the situation (Tugade & Frederickson, 2004), write about
their feelings (Pennebaker & Chung, 2007), or eat away at tasty but fattening
foods (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). Although the notion of
‘‘strategies’’ seems to imply conscious deliberation, the term as it is used in
the present article is agnostic about the underlying process. The strategic
aspect of a given emotion-regulation process refers to its specification of how a
given act of emotion regulation is implemented. This specification requires
making decisions about the implementation of emotion regulation, but people
may not be always fully aware of these decisions.
The ordering problem
The potential variety of emotion-regulation strategies is enormous, given
that any activity that impacts people’s emotions may (at least, in principle)
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be recruited in the service of emotion regulation. Finding an underlying
order in people’s emotion-regulation strategies therefore represents a
formidable scientific challenge. One empirical method used to classify
emotion-regulation strategies is exploratory factor analysis (e.g., Thayer,
Newman, & McCain, 1994). However, this approach suffers from problems
of interpretability and difficulties in ensuring the comprehensiveness of the
categories that are derived (see Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003).
For instance, in the coping domain, multiple factor analyses, even on the
same set of items, have not produced a replicable structure in coping
strategies (Skinner et al., 2003). Another empirical method is rational
sorting, which involves grouping items that share common features and
separating items that differ (e.g., Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). Rational
sorting is similarly associated with problems of comprehensiveness, and has
not converged on a common set of categories in the coping domain (Skinner
et al., 2003).
The most rigorous approach to the ordering problem combines top-down
(theoretical) and bottom-up (empirical) approaches. In this combined
approach, one first defines the higher-order categories of emotion-regulation
strategies, after which an empirical approach (such as confirmatory factor
analysis) is used to test the fit of specific emotion-regulation strategies into
the higher-order categories. To date, a combined top-down/bottom-up
approach has not been applied to the classification of emotion-regulation
strategies (though see Skinner et al., 2003, for illustrations in the coping
domain). Nevertheless, researchers have proposed several concepts that seem
potentially useful in fleshing out the higher-order categories of emotion-
regulation strategies.
One potentially useful category distinguishes between automatic versus
controlled emotion-regulation processes. An attractive aspect of this
distinction is that it cuts across the complete range of emotion-regulation
strategies (Mauss et al., 2007). However, automaticity is a heterogeneous
construct. Indeed, a recent conceptual analysis identified as many as eight
concepts associated with automaticity that may vary more or less indepen-
dently: intentionality; goal dependence; controllability; autonomy; the
extent to which a process is stimulus driven; consciousness; efficiency; and
speed (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For constructing a taxonomy, it is
desirable to have categories that are functionally homogeneous (see Skinner
et al., 2003, on criteria for a scientific taxonomy). The concept of
automaticity is therefore less suitable in classifying emotion-regulation
strategies.
Another influential approach, the so-called ‘‘process model’’ of emotion
regulation, has proposed that emotion-regulation strategies may be classified
by the time at which they intervene in the emotion-generation process
(Gross, 1998a,b, 2001). The process model assumes that emotion responses
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are generated in a fixed cycle, such that attention to emotionally relevant
information precedes cognitive appraisals, which in turn precede emotionally
expressive behaviour. However, research indicates that the order in which
emotion responses are generated is in fact variable. Attention, cognitive
appraisals, or behaviour may each occur early or late in the emotion-
generation process. For instance, bodily movements may directly activate
emotional experiences (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Strack, Martin, & Stepper,
1988), and merely attending to emotional stimuli may directly trigger
emotional behaviour without any intervening cognitive appraisals (e.g.,
Neumann, Fo¨rster, & Strack, 2003). The temporal order of the emotion-
generation process therefore offers no basis for systematically relating
emotion-regulation strategies to different classes of emotion responses.
Targets of emotion regulation
Regardless of considerations about the timing of emotion-generation
processes, the process model (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001) calls attention to the
targets of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is always directed at
manipulating some emotional response. It is plausible that the type of
emotional response that is targeted for regulation will at least partly
determine how people go about the emotion-regulation process. The
emotion-generation system that is targeted for regulation may thus serve
as a higher-order category to classify different emotion-regulation strategies.
Among the three most widely studied emotion-generating systems are
attention, knowledge, and bodily expressions of emotion. Emotion regula-
tion may thus target one or more of these three broad emotion-generating
systems (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Philippot,
Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 2004).
The first of the emotion-generating systems, attention, consists of a set of
neurological networks that allow people to select incoming information from
sensory input (Fan, McCandliss, Fosella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005).
Attention has been extensively researched within cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience (see Posner & Rothbart, 2007, for a review). The
resulting insights and methods are increasingly finding their way to the study
of emotion regulation (Derakshan, Eysenck, & Meyers, 2007; Ochsner &
Gross, 2005; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007, in press). For instance, emotion
regulation has been examined in well-established attentional paradigms such
as the emotional Stroop task (e.g., Newman & McKinney, 2002), and the
dot-probe task (e.g., Fox, 1993). Attentional processing in emotion regula-
tion has also been manipulated, for instance by providing people with an
attention-demanding task (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) or training exercises
(Brown et al., 2007).
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Emotion-relevant knowledge constitutes a second broad, emotion-
generating system. Among the most widely studied types of emotion
knowledge are cognitive appraisals, which consist of people’s subjective
evaluations during their encounter with emotionally significant events
(Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Particularly important
is the appraisal whether or not an event is relevant to the satisfaction or
frustration of important goals and motives (Lazarus, 1991; Moors, 2007).
Other important appraisals include attributions of an event to self versus
others, controllability of the event, accountability, expectations (Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), and implicit theories of
emotion (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007b). Emotionally significant
knowledge may also be retrieved from memory (e.g., Joormann & Siemer,
2004), and may differ in terms of structure and processing aspects, including
their differentiation (Tugade, Frederickson, & Barrett, 2004), complexity
(Kang & Shaver, 2004), and awareness (Ruys & Stapel, 2008).
The third of the emotion-generating systems includes the many embodied
ways in which emotions unfold, including facial expressions, bodily postures,
voluntary and involuntary motor movements, and psycho-physiological
responses (see Mauss & Robinson, in press, for a review). In as far as
attention and appraisals influence the body (e.g., Dandenau, Baldwin,
Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007; Sapolsky, 2007), one might
question whether the body represents a separate emotion-generating system.
Nevertheless, bodily emotion responses often follow different patterns than
cognitive emotion responses (Mauss & Robinson, in press). Moreover,
bodily emotion responses shape the course of people’s emotions in ways that
cannot be reduced to attention or appraisal processes (Niedenthal et al.,
2005; Zajonc, 1998). A separate status for the body is further warranted
because several important emotion-regulation strategies, such as expressive
suppression (Gross, 1998a) and progressive muscle relaxation (Esch,
Fricchione, & Stefano, 2003), primarily target bodily manifestations of
emotion.
When emotion-regulation strategies are merely classified by their targeted
emotion-generation system, this results in rather heterogeneous groupings.
For instance, repressive coping (Langens & Mo¨rth, 2003) and mindfulness
training (Brown et al., 2007) may both target attention, even though the
latter involves purposefully paying attention to negative emotion, whereas
the former avoids negative emotion altogether. In this regard, mindfulness
training seems more similar to expressive writing about one’s emotional
experiences (Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). However, expressive writing also
involves acquiring more insight into one’s emotions, and hence targets
knowledge systems. Although these are just a few examples, it appears that
some important element is still missing from the classification of emotion-
regulation strategies.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION REGULATION 13
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
07
:5
9 
25
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
Functions of emotion regulation
The missing element may be the functions of emotion regulation. By
regulating their emotions, people seek to achieve certain psychological
outcomes or functions. The functions of emotion regulation cut across all
emotion-regulation strategies, and apply regardless of whether these
strategies are directed at attention, knowledge, or the body. As such, the
functions of emotion regulation represent a basic category for characterising
different emotion strategies, a category that is independent of which
emotion-generating system is targeted.
Traditionally, psychologists have assumed that people’s emotion-regula-
tion efforts serve hedonic needs that are aimed at promoting pleasure and
preventing pain (e.g., Larsen, 2000; Westen, 1994). Negative emotional states
are costly, because they mobilise a wide array of mental and physical
resources within the individual (Sapolsky, 2007). Need-oriented emotion
regulation may thus be adaptive, by allowing individuals to conserve these
resources by promoting a rapid return to hedonically agreeable states.
Because hedonic needs presumably operate on subcognitive levels of
information processing (Panksepp, 1998), need-oriented emotion regulation
may operate even in the absence of any conscious emotion-regulation goal.
Indeed, hedonic needs may be immediately activated upon encountering
emotional stimuli (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Neumann et al., 2003).
Because the need-oriented functions of emotion regulation are directed
towards immediate gratification, this type of emotion regulation often has
an impulsive quality (Tice et al., 2001).
Although hedonic needs are important, they cannot account for the full
range of emotion-regulation processes (Erber, 1996; Erber & Erber, 2000).
For instance, social interactions often require people to remain ‘‘cool and
collected’’, and hence may lead people to down-regulate both negative and
positive moods (Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996). Other types of goals
may similarly increase the utility of hedonically aversive states (Achtzinger,
Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008; Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007a), and thereby
motivate emotion regulation efforts to attain or maintain those states. For
instance, because many people believe that fear and worry promote the
attainment of avoidance goals, people who adopt avoidance goals may be
motivated to maintain these negative emotions (Tamir et al., 2007a). In a
related vein, changes in task demands may decrease the relevance of
emotionally charged information, leading people to devote fewer processing
resources to emotion-eliciting information (Van Dillen & Koole, in press).
Rather than being hedonically oriented, the latter forms of emotion
regulation are oriented towards the priorities that are set by specific norms,
goals, or tasks. Emotion regulation may thus serve important goal-oriented
functions.
14 KOOLE
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
07
:5
9 
25
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
Some of the functions of emotion regulation may extend even beyond
single goals. In particular, emotion regulation may allow people to balance
multiple goal pursuits (Koole & Kuhl, 2007; Rothermund et al., 2008) and
promote integration among personality processes (Baumann, Kaschel, &
Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl, 2000). Human personality consists of many interacting
processes, the joint functioning of which has emergent, system-level proper-
ties that cannot be reduced to the behaviour of its individual elements
(Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000). As such, emotion-regulation
processes at the level of the whole person serve distinct psychological
functions. The person-oriented functions of emotion regulation have been
elaborated by personality systems interactions theory (PSI), (Kuhl, 2000).
According to PSI theory, emotion regulation may facilitate personality
functioning in two major ways. First, by preventing people becoming locked
up in specific motivational-emotional states, emotion regulation may
promote flexibility in personality functioning (see Rothermund et al.,
2008). Second, by stimulating the dynamic exchange between personality
processes, emotion regulation may promote coherence and long-term
stability within the overall personality system (Baumann et al., 2005).
Emotion regulation may thus serve multiple functions, including the
satisfaction of hedonic needs, facilitation of specific goals and tasks, and
optimisation of personality functioning. In many cases, people may combine
these functions. For instance, when people experience emotional distress,
boosting positive emotions may simultaneously satisfy hedonic needs,
facilitate compliance with social norms for emotional neutrality, and
increase the overall flexibility of the personality system. The functions
may also conflict. Both goal- and person-oriented emotion regulation may
require people to tolerate negative emotional states, and may thus conflict
with need-oriented emotion regulation. Moreover, goal-oriented emotion
regulation may conflict with person-oriented emotion regulation because the
former has a narrower focus. For instance, extended activation of goal-
oriented emotion regulation may cause over-activation of the sympathetic
nervous system (Thayer & Lane, 2007). When the latter occurs, person-
oriented emotion regulation will aim to restore autonomic balance and thus
conflict with goal-oriented emotion regulation.
How people resolve conflicts between need-, goal-, or person-oriented
functions is largely unknown. Conceivably, people alternate between
functions. Need-oriented functions may become more important when
people are experiencing acute emotional distress; goal-oriented functions
when there are strong situational norms for appropriate emotional
responding; and person-oriented functions when people are oriented
towards their long-term well-being. It is also plausible that there exist
individual differences in the preferential use of each function. For instance,
need-oriented functions may be more important among repressive copers
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(Derakshan et al., 2007), and person-oriented functions may be more
important among individuals with a secure attachment style (Mikulincer et
al., 2003) or action-oriented individuals (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994).
Summary
Emotion-regulation strategies specify how people go about managing a
particular unwanted emotion. A consensual, empirically validated taxonomy
that spans all known emotion-regulation strategies has yet to be developed.
Nevertheless, the literature has yielded several higher-order categories that
seem useful in classifying emotion-regulation strategies. The most viable
higher-order categories to this end are the emotion-generating system that is
targeted and the psychological functions that are served by emotion
regulation. Among the major emotion-generating systems that are targeted
in emotion regulation are attention, knowledge, and the body. The main
functions of emotion regulation are promoting the satisfaction of hedonic
needs, facilitating goal achievement, and optimising global personality
functioning.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMOTION-REGULATION
STRATEGIES
The classification of emotion-regulation strategies by their targets and
functions offers a preliminary basis for reviewing the extant literature. An
overview of the target by function classification is provided in Table 1.
Notably, this classification scheme does not propose a new theoretical
explanation of emotion-regulation strategies. Rather, it provides a descrip-
tive framework for organising the known universe of emotion-regulation
strategies. The classification will hopefully stimulate the development of
more sophisticated models that can provide a mechanistic explanation for
the observed differences between emotion-regulation strategies.
The remainder of this section will use the target by function classification
to organise the literature on emotion-regulation strategies. For each
psychological function of emotion regulation, I first discuss the criteria for
deciding whether emotion-regulation strategies fit with this function. I then
review the empirical evidence for emotion-regulation strategies that are
oriented towards each function, which may respectively target attention,
knowledge representations, or bodily manifestations of emotion. Some work
has suggested that emotion-regulation strategies that target attention or
knowledge are more effective than strategies that target bodily expressions of
emotion (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001). Accordingly, I also consider the relative
effectiveness of cognitive versus bodily emotion-regulation strategies for
each psychological function of emotion regulation.
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The present review is necessarily selective, and focuses on well-controlled,
process-oriented research. The main emphasis is on emotion-regulation
strategies that are widely used among psychologically healthy individuals.
When relevant, however, the present review considers individual differences
in emotion regulation. For instance, if an emotion-regulation strategy is used
particularly often by certain individuals, highlighting this group can bring
into sharper focus those processes that are involved in this particular
emotion-regulation strategy. Moreover, in as far as individual differences in
emotion regulation are stable over time, their study can shed more light on
TABLE 1
Target by function classification of emotion-regulation strategies
Psychological function
Emotion-generating
system Need-oriented Goal-oriented Person-oriented
Attention Thinking pleasurable
or relaxing thoughts
(Langens & Mo¨rth,
2003);
Attentional
avoidance
(Derakshan et al.,
2007)
Effortful distraction
(Van Dillen &
Koole, 2007);
Thought
suppression
(Wenzlaff & Wegner,
2000)
Attentional counter-
regulation (Rothermund
et al., 2008);
Meditation (Cahn &
Polich, 2006);
Mindfulness training
(Brown et al., 2007)
Knowledge Cognitive dissonance
reduction (Harmon-
Jones & Mills, 1999);
Motivated reasoning
(Kunda, 1990);
Self-defence (Tesser,
2000)
Cognitive
reappraisal (Gross,
1998b; Ochsner &
Gross, 2008)
Expressive writing
(Pennebaker, 1997);
Specification of
emotional experience
(Neumann & Philippot,
2007);
Activating stored
networks of emotion
knowledge (Barrett
et al., 2001)
Body Stress-induced eating
(Greeno & Wing,
1994);
Stress-induced
affiliation (Taylor
et al., 2000)
Expressive
suppression
(Gross, 1998a);
Response
exaggeration
(Schmeichel et al.,
2006)
Venting (Bushman
et al., 2001)
Controlled breathing
(Philippot et al., 2002);
Progressive muscle
relaxation (Esch et al.,
2003)
Note: Cited articles refer to relevant empirical demonstrations or literature reviews.
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the potential long-term consequences of using specific emotion-regulation
strategies.
Need-oriented emotion regulation
Need-oriented emotion regulation is driven by people’s needs to experience
hedonically rewarding states, which consist of low levels of negative and high
levels of positive emotion. Because needs can operate on a subcognitive level
(Panksepp, 1998), need-oriented strategies can emerge in the absence of
explicit goals or instructions to strive for a favourable hedonic state. The
strongest evidence for need-oriented emotion regulation is provided by
emotion-regulation behaviour that maximises short-term emotional benefits
at the expense of long-term well-being (cf. Tice et al., 2001). Nevertheless,
need-oriented emotion regulation does not inevitably lead to poor long-term
outcomes. Theoretically, need-oriented emotion regulation should mainly
undermine long-term well-being in cases where there exists a conflict
between short-term hedonic benefits and long-term outcomes. In the
absence of such conflicts, need-oriented emotion regulation may be adaptive.
Consequently, discriminate use of need-oriented emotion regulation could
be beneficial, whereas chronic use of need-oriented emotion regulation is
likely to have adverse consequences.
Attention. Some of the most robust evidence for need-oriented regula-
tion of attention is based on research on individual differences in repressive
coping style (Derakshan et al., 2007; Weinberger, Schwarz, & Davidson,
1979). In this research, individuals who score high on a measure of social
desirability (indicative of a self-aggrandising response style) and low on a
measure of trait anxiety are identified as repressors. Over many studies,
repressors have been found to avoid negative emotional stimuli to a greater
degree than non-repressors (see Derakshan et al., 2007, for a review). For
instance, relative to non-repressors, repressors avert their gaze more often
from unpleasant emotional stimuli (Haley, 1974; Olson & Zanna, 1979), and
spend less time reading negative personality feedback (Baumeister & Cairns,
1992).
Attentional avoidance of negative stimuli among repressors has further
emerged in well-established cognitive tasks, including the emotional Stroop
task (Myers & McKenna, 1996; Newman & McKinney, 2002), the dot-probe
task (Fox, 1993), and the lexical decision task (Langens & Mo¨rth, 2003). A
sophisticated model of repressive coping is vigilance-avoidance theory, which
proposes that repressors respond to threatening stimuli in two stages
(Derakshan et al., 2007). The first stage, which is presumably automatic
and non-conscious, consists of a vigilance response of elevated behavioural
and physiological anxiety. The second stage, which presumably involves
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more strategic and controlled processes, consists of attentional avoidance
and cognitive denial of anxiety.
When faced with threatening information, repressors may also increase
their attention to positive information (Boden & Baumeister, 1997; Langens
& Mo¨rth, 2003). The level of threat may determine whether repressors cope
with threats by avoiding negative information or seeking out positive
information (Langens & Mo¨rth, 2003). When threat levels are low,
repressors may avoid emotionally threatening information by shifting their
attention away from the threat. When threat levels are high, repressors may
be forced to pay a certain amount of attention to the threat and thus resort
to more effortful distraction strategies such as generating positive imagery.
Repressive coping is associated with short-term relief from emotional
distress (e.g., Boden & Baumeister, 1997). Many long-term outcomes that
are linked to repressive coping are negative. Relative to non-repressors,
repressors possess less insight into their own emotional states (Lane,
Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, & Kaszniak, 2000), and display intrusive
thoughts, even after initial success at thought suppression (Geraerts,
Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, 2006). Repressive coping is also associated
with adverse health outcomes1 (see Myers, 2000; Myers et al., in press, for
reviews), such as heightened susceptibility to infectious disease (Jamner,
Schwarz, & Leigh, 1988), inhibited immune function (Barger, Bachen,
Marsland, & Manuck, 2000), and increased risk for coronary heart disease,
cancer, and asthma (Weinberger, 1990).
Knowledge. Ever since Freud (1915/1961) introduced the notion of
psychological defence mechanisms, generations of researchers have been
intrigued by the idea that people may distort their perceptions of reality to
ward off anxiety and other types of negative emotion. In social psychology,
Festinger’s (1957) pioneering work on cognitive dissonance reduction (see
Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999, for a recent overview) has spawned a large and
sophisticated body of research on interpretive biases (Baumeister &
1 The literature on repressive coping has reported some positive effects on health (e.g.,
Coifman, Bonanno, Ray, & Gross, 2007). However, this research used affectiveautonomic
response discrepancy (AARD) as an index of repressive coping. With the AARD measure,
repressors are those who report low levels of negative affect following threat while
simultaneously displaying high levels of physiological activity, such as elevated heart rate or
skin conductance. An important problem of this index is that the underlying physiological
measures are not informative about emotional valence. Thus, high AARD scores could be due
to unreported negative emotion or unreported positive emotion. To the extent that AARD
scores are driven by unreported positive emotion, this measure may index counter-regulation
processes (Rothermund et al., 2008) rather than repressive coping. Because of this ambiguity, the
present review only considers the results for the more conventional self-report measure of
repressive coping.
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Newman, 1994; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Tesser, 2000). Among other
things, people may engage in selective criticism of threatening information
(Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), trivialise the information (Simon, Greenberg,
& Brehm, 1995), selectively forget the information (Sedikides & Green,
2004), make self-serving attributions (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999), inflate
their self-conceptions in a non-threatened domain (McGregor, 2006), engage
in downward social comparison (Taylor & Lobel, 1989), and derogate others
(Fein & Spencer, 1997). From this list of defences, which is far from
complete, it appears that people may recruit virtually any type of judgement
for defensive purposes (Roese & Olson, 2007).
Defensive processes are mutually substitutable (Tesser, 2000), consistent
with the notion that they serve the common purpose of emotion regulation.
The emotion regulation function of defensive bias is further supported by
findings that affirming positive views of the self down-regulates negative
emotion, especially when emotion is assessed by physiological or implicit
measures (Creswell et al., 2005; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, &
Dijksterhuis, 1999; Roese & Olson, 2007). In addition, defensive bias is
associated with neural activity in regions that are implicated in emotion
regulation, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Westen, Kilts,
Blagov, Harenski, & Hamann, 2006). Notably, defensive bias is not
associated with activation in brain regions that support effortful self-
regulation, even though such regions are implicated in goal-oriented
emotion-regulation strategies (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).
The potential adaptiveness of defensive bias has been subject to
considerable debate. Extreme and rigid forms of defensive bias appear to
undermine psychological adjustment (Colvin & Block, 1994). Moreover,
defensive bias has been linked to the repressive coping style (Derakshan
et al., 2007), which in turn is associated with poor health outcomes (Myers,
2000; Myers et al., in press). However, more moderate and flexible forms of
defensive bias are positively associated with mental health (Baumeister, 1989;
Kunda, 1990; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000).
Body. Bodily activities that provide immediate gratification represent a
major target for need-oriented emotion regulation. One such activity is
eating. Eating palatable food provides pleasant sensations to the mouth and
stomach, and thus can be used for need-oriented emotion regulation. Stress-
induced eating is a common emotion-regulation strategy, especially among
restrained eaters (Greeno & Wing, 1994). Chronic use of eating as an
emotion-regulation strategy may result in unhealthy behaviour patterns such
as overeating or binge eating (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). There are
also psychological disadvantages associated with this strategy, given that
chronic overeaters have greater difficulty identifying and making sense of
their emotional states (Whiteside et al., 2007). Notably, the emotional profile
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of overeaters resembles that of repressors, suggesting that stress-induced
eating may be linked to repressive coping (cf. Derakshan et al., 2007).
The emotion regulation effects of eating may be partly explained by
attentional processes. For instance, binge eating may down-regulate emo-
tional distress by focusing people’s attention on their immediate physical
sensations (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). However, eating also has
neuro-endocrine effects that may reduce emotional distress. For instance,
eating palatable food can stimulate the endogenous release of opioids (Adam
& Epel, 2007; Morley & Levine, 1980). Because opioids relieve stress, this
mechanism may explain why individual engage in stress-induced eating.
Animal research has offered some support for this model: When rats are
treated with opioid antagonists, they display a marked reduction in stress-
induced eating (Hawkins, Cubic, Baumeister, & Barton, 1992).
Physical activities other than eating may also be recruited in need-
oriented emotion regulation. Potential candidates are stress-induced con-
sumption behaviours such as alcohol intake (Mohr, Brennan, Mohr, Armeli,
& Tennen, 2008; Sher & Grekin, 2007; Zack, Poulos, Fragopoulos,
Woodford, & MacLeod, 2006) and smoking (Gilbert et al., 2007). Other
bodily emotion-regulation strategies that may be at least partly need-
oriented are regular physical exercise, particularly when people have
developed exercise habits (Thayer, 1987), and stress-induced proximity
seeking, particularly among women (Taylor et al., 2000). These bodily
emotion-regulation strategies may provide immediate hedonic benefits, in as
far as they involve behaviours that can be easily and spontaneously executed.
Summary
Need-oriented strategies regulate emotional responses to promote the
satisfaction of hedonic needs. Overall, the literature has emphasised the
need to minimise negative emotion over the need to maximise positive
emotion. On an attentional level, need-oriented emotion regulation may
occur through avoidance of threatening information or distraction by
positive information, tendencies that are especially prevalent among
repressive copers. On a representational level, need-oriented emotion
regulation may take the form of various interpretive biases, which may
serve anxiety-reducing functions. Finally, on a physical level, need-oriented
emotion regulation may occur through activities such as eating, physical
exercise, or proximity seeking. Regardless of whether they target attention,
knowledge representations, or the body, need-oriented strategies of emotion
regulation are associated with immediate emotional relief that often comes at
the expense of long-term well-being (Tice et al., 2001).
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Goal-oriented emotion regulation
Goal-oriented emotion regulation is directed by a single verbally reportable
goal, norm, or task. There are two major ways in which goal-oriented
emotion regulation may operate. First, goal-oriented emotion regulation
may be driven by people’s beliefs about the utility of particular emotional
states. These beliefs may be influenced by verbal instructions about the
desirability of certain emotional states (e.g., Achtzinger et al., 2008; Gross,
1998a), by implicit or explicit beliefs about the utility of particular emotional
states (Tamir et al., 2007a), or by more abstract theories that people have
about emotion regulation (Tamir et al., 2007b). Second, an ongoing goal,
task, or norm may change the relevance of emotionally charged information.
Emotionally charged information that is (potentially) relevant to the
ongoing task is likely to be maintained, whereas emotionally charged
information that is irrelevant is likely to be ignored or down-regulated (Van
Dillen & Koole, in press). Because goals, norms, or tasks may favour various
types of emotional outcomes, goal-oriented emotion regulation may either
promote or inhibit emotional states that are hedonically rewarding.
Attention. Goals can control attention in a top-down manner (Posner &
Rothbart, 2007). Accordingly, attention forms a prime target for goal-
oriented emotion-regulation strategies. Erber et al. (1996) found that people
who anticipated interacting with an unknown other attended more to
materials of the opposite emotional valence to their current mood state.
Presumably, people engaged in this form of attention regulation because it is
counter-normative to behave highly emotionally in dealing with strangers.
Importantly, social-interaction goals fostered attention to negative stimuli
when people’s initial moods were positive. As such, these studies demon-
strate that goal-oriented emotion regulation can be dissociated from people’s
hedonic needs (see Erber & Erber, 2000).
A critical factor in goal-oriented regulation of attention appears to be the
availability of distracting stimuli. Indeed, simply instructing individuals ‘‘not
to think about’’ an unwanted emotion may ironically serve to heighten the
activation of this emotion (Wegner et al., 1993; Wegner & Gold, 1995).
Research on mental control (Wegner, 1994) has found that providing people
with a focused distracter (such as, ‘‘Think about a red Volkswagen) greatly
increases the efficiency of thought suppression attempts. Depressed indivi-
duals seem to have particular difficulties in finding suitable distracters
(Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). As such, the breakdown of self-
generation of distracters may play a key role in the persistence of depression
(Joormann & Siemer, 2004).
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Given that any demanding task can divert attention, even neutral tasks
may have emotion-regulatory implications (Erber & Tesser, 1992). Indeed,
studies have shown that distraction with neutral materials can reduce
depression (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Mor-
row, 1993), and anger (Gerin, Davidson, Goyal, Christenfeld, & Schwartz,
2006; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). For instance, in one study (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), focusing attention on descriptions of
geographic locations and objects led depressed participants to experience
reductions in depressed mood, whereas focusing on current feeling states
and personal characteristics led depressed participants to experience
increases in depressed mood.
The effects of performing a neutral task on emotion regulation may be
understood in terms of underlying working-memory processes (Van Dillen &
Koole, 2007). Emotional states spontaneously and unintentionally activate
emotion-congruent cognitions in working memory (Bower & Mayer, 1989;
Siemer, 2005). This congruent processing stream may be interrupted when
working memory is loaded with an alternative task. Consistent with this
model, tasks that draw upon working memory have been found to be
particularly effective in reducing the emotional impact of vivid emotion-
laden stimuli (Erber & Tesser, 1992; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007, in press).
Moreover, performing a working-memory task attenuates the neural
response to negative emotional stimuli (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole,
2008). Working-memory load can even eliminate attentional interference of
negative stimuli (Van Dillen & Koole, in press), an effect that has previously
been regarded as automatic (Pratto & John, 1991).
Knowledge. The explicit goals and norms that guide goal-oriented
emotion regulation are encoded in a linguistic format (Ochsner & Gross,
2005, 2008). Goal-oriented emotion regulation is therefore highly compa-
tible with linguistic appraisal processes. During cognitive reappraisal, people
reduce the emotional impact of an event by changing their subjective
evaluations of this event (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001). Cognitive reappraisal may
take the form of: (a) reinterpreting situational or contextual aspects of
stimuli (e.g., imagining a potentially upsetting image is fake); or (b)
distancing oneself from stimuli by adopting a detached, third-person
perspective (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Cognitive reappraisal can inhibit the
experience of unwanted emotions, although it does not consistently decrease
psycho-physiological arousal (Gross, 1998a; Steptoe & Vogele, 1986). The
strategy draws upon working-memory resources (Schmeichel, Volokhov, &
Demaree, in press), but is relatively efficient in that it does not impair
people’s memory for ongoing social interactions (Richards & Gross, 2000).
Reappraisal processes have been intensely researched in neuroimaging
studies (e.g., Beauregard, Levesque, & Bourgouin, 2001; Ochsner, Bunge,
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Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; see Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008, for reviews).
These studies have shown consistently that cognitive reappraisal inhibits
activation in emotional regions, including the amygdalae and insula, and
increases activation in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex,
regions that support working memory, language, and long-term memory.
During reappraisal, emotional regions of the brain may become inversely
coupled to the activation of specific regions in the prefrontal cortex (Urry
et al., 2006). These findings are consistent with the idea that reappraisal
triggers top-down control of emotion-generating systems. Notably, reap-
praisal activates some of the same brain regions as tasks involving top-down
attention control (Ochsner et al., 2002), and the effects of reappraisal are
partly explained by shifts in visual attention away from emotion-eliciting
stimuli (Van Reekum et al., 2007). Some reappraisal processes may thus be
driven by attentional mechanisms rather than changes in knowledge
representations.
Body. The verbal processes that mediate goal-oriented emotion regula-
tion have limited access to embodied emotion processes (Loewenstein, 1996;
Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2006). Accordingly, goal-oriented
emotion regulation may resort to more indirect ways of regulating the body.
Goal-oriented control of the body is typically focused on outward bodily
manifestations of emotion, such as facial expressions or overt movements
and bodily postures, because these are under the control of explicit norms
and goals.
One goal-oriented strategy of emotion regulation that targets the body is
expressive suppression (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001). In this strategy, people actively
inhibit their emotional expressions. For example, an individual might try to
keep a straight face while telling a lie. Expressive suppression has been found
to draw upon working-memory resources (Schmeichel et al., in press), to
interfere with people’s memory of ongoing social interactions (Richards &
Gross, 2000), and increase sympathetic control of the heart (Demaree et al.,
2006). Despite its effortful nature, expressive suppression does little to
prevent the experience of unwanted emotions, even when it effectively
inhibits bodily expressions of emotion (Gross, 1998a; Schmeichel et al., in
press).
The foregoing suggests that expressive suppression may often create a
discrepancy between inner experience and outer expression, a condition that
may arouse ‘‘expressive dissonance’’ (Robinson & Demaree, 2007). Indeed,
individuals who chronically use expressive suppression report a sense of
being inauthentic or ‘‘fake’’ in their social relationships (Gross & John,
2003). These alienating effects may be part of the reason why chronic
expressive suppression is linked to low emotional well-being (Gross & John,
2003). Notably, the negative effects of expression suppression may be specific
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to members of Western cultures (Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007). Whereas
Western cultures traditionally value open emotion expression, Asian cultures
traditionally value emotional restraint (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007).
Consequently, expressive suppression may be perceived as less negative by
individuals with Asian cultural values. Consistent with this, recent work has
shown that, among individuals with Asian cultural values, expressive
suppression is associated with neither increased negative emotion nor
reduced social responsiveness (Butler et al., 2007).
Given the difficulties of expressive suppression (at least, among members
of Western cultures), goal-oriented regulation processes may try to redirect
bodily emotion responses rather than eliminating them altogether. For
instance, people may engage in response exaggeration, by deliberately
exaggerating their responses to an emotional stimulus (Schmeichel et al.,
2006). Another redirection strategy is venting, an emotion-regulation process
in which people intentionally give free reign to their emotional impulses
(Breuer & Freud, 18931895/1955; see Bushman et al., 2001). Venting is a
popular strategy in controlling anger and aggression (Bushman et al., 2001).
On the surface, venting seems to be the opposite of expressive suppression.
Nevertheless, venting is a goal-driven strategy to regulate bodily expressions
of emotion, just as expressive suppression (Bushman et al., 2001). Although
venting is widely advertised, research indicates that venting anger actually
increases anger and aggression (Geen & Quanty, 1977). Presumably, venting
adds fuel to the flame by heightening the activation of angry thoughts and
action tendencies (Bushman, 2002), which in turn promote angry emotion
and behaviour.
Summary
Goal-oriented strategies of emotion regulation are driven by a single explicit
goal, task, or norm. Some of the most effective goal-oriented strategies direct
attention away from stimuli that could trigger unwanted emotions. Effortful
tasks that draw upon working memory resources have been found to be
particularly potent distracters. Other relatively effective goal-oriented strate-
gies use cognitive reappraisal, a process that modifies the emotional impact of
events by changing people’s assessments of these events. Some of the least
effective goal-oriented strategies target bodily expressions of emotion,
through processes such as expressive suppression, response exaggeration, or
venting. Overall, in the domain of goal-oriented emotion regulation, cognitive
strategies appear to be more effective than bodily strategies.
Person-oriented emotion regulation
Person-oriented emotion regulation maintains the integrity of the overall
personality system, which consists of the entirety of a person’s needs, goals,
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motives, and other self-aspects. A first signature of person-oriented emotion
regulation is its holistic focus. Whereas need-oriented and goal-oriented
emotion regulation focus on aspects of emotional or task-related functioning,
person-oriented emotion regulation is geared to the functioning of the whole
person. A second signature of person-oriented emotion regulation is
contextual sensitivity, which is expressed in the ability to alternate between
different motivational, cognitive, or affective subsystems in a context-
appropriate manner (Rothermund et al., 2008). A third signature of person-
oriented emotion regulation is integration, which is manifested in the co-
ordinated functioning of personality systems that are traditionally regarded
as antagonistic, such as positive versus negative emotions, body versus mind,
passion versus reason, and top-down versus bottom-up processing.
Attention. An important pattern in the person-oriented regulation of
attention is the counter-regulation principle (Rothermund et al., 2008).
According to this principle, people are equipped with attentional biases
that prevent the perseveration of current motivational or emotional states.
Attentional counter regulation presumably helps to restore a balanced
receptiveness to positive and negative information despite currently active
affective-motivational states. Counter-regulation thus fosters contextual
sensitivity, an important signature of person-oriented emotion regulation.
Counter-regulation processes are indirectly supported by many studies
showing that positive and negative events tend to have only short-term
consequences for people’s emotional states (e.g., Gilbert, Lieberman,
Morewedge, &Wilson, 2004). In addition, controlled experimental studies
have confirmed the existence of attentional biases in the opposite direction
as people’s current emotional-motivational states (Derryberry, 1993; Rother-
mund et al., 2008; Tugade & Frederickson, 2004). Depending on the context,
attentional counter-regulation may inhibit either positive or negative
emotion (Rothermund et al., 2008). Accordingly, counter-regulation is
distinct from need-oriented emotion regulation. Consistent with its global
adaptive functions, attentional counter regulation is most pronounced
among individuals disposed towards flexible action control (Jostmann et
al., 2005; Koole & Coenen, 2007; Koole & Jostmann, 2004), and largely
absent among individuals suffering from chronic anxiety, phobia, or
dysphoria (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).
Person-oriented regulation of attention may be stimulated by activities
such as meditation (Cahn & Polich, 2006) and mindfulness training (Brown
et al., 2007). Meditation refers to practices that ‘‘self-regulate the body and
mind, thereby affecting mental events by engaging in a specific attentional
set’’ (Cahn & Polich, 2006, p. 180). Mindfulness training evolved out of
certain meditative practices, and encourages people to engage in a mere
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noticing of their internal and external experiences in an objective manner,
without the biasing influence of pre-existing cognitive schemas (Brown et al.,
2007). Meditation and mindfulness training both foster emotion-regulation
abilities (see Brown et al., 2007; Cahn & Polich, 2006, for reviews). The
mechanisms that underlie meditation and mindfulness training are incom-
pletely understood. Nevertheless, both practices promote personality
integration, as indicated by greater neurological synchronisation (Cahn &
Polich, 2006) and increased congruence between implicit and explicit self-
aspects (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Koole, Govorun, & Cheng, 2008). The latter
findings fit with the involvement of person-oriented emotion regulation.
Knowledge. Common sense has long held that people may overcome
traumatic experiences by ‘‘putting their feelings in perspective’’ or ‘‘working
through’’ their emotions. These metaphors appear to describe cognitive
integration processes, in which emotionally charged information becomes
incorporated into larger networks of the person’s experiences. Though initially
painful, cognitive integration processes may eventually down-regulate un-
wanted emotions and create the conditions for personal growth (Baumann &
Kuhl, 2002; Kuhl, 2000). Integration of aversive emotional experiences thus
represents an important form of person-oriented emotion regulation.
Expressive writing is one activity that may foster integration of emotional
experiences. Studies have shown that expressive writing down-regulates
emotional distress and improves both physical and psychological health
(Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). These beneficial effects may
arise because expressive writing helps to turn initially disturbing emotional
experiences into coherent narratives (Smyth, True, & Souto, 2001), which
down-regulates emotional distress and promotes insight into the self and
one’s emotions (Klein & Boals, 2001; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997).
Once emotion-relevant knowledge has been acquired, this knowledge may
assist in subsequent emotion-regulation efforts. Specifically, as people’s
emotion knowledge becomes broader and more differentiated, new emo-
tional experiences may be incorporated more easily into their existing
cognitive schema (Kuhl, 2000). Individuals who possess relatively differ-
entiated knowledge of self and emotion indeed display more efficient
emotion regulation, both in childhood (Diamond & Aspinwall, 2003) and
adulthood (Barrett, Gross, Conner, & Benvenuto, 2001; Linville, 1985, 1987;
Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). Autobiographical knowledge about the self
and emotion may thus form an extended memory system that allows people
to down-regulate unwanted emotions (Kuhl, 2000; Philippot et al., 2004).
People may access the emotion-regulatory functions of the autobiogra-
phical memory system whenever they process the specific details of an
emotional experience. Indeed, imagining the distinctive details of emotional
memories, rather than their general aspects, reduces the emotional intensity
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of these memories (Neumann & Philippot, 2007). Furthermore, deficits in
emotion regulation, such as chronic depression and ruminative thinking, are
associated with reduced specificity of autobiographical memory (Williams
et al., 2007). Experimental studies have shown that concrete, experiential
thoughts (e.g., ‘‘How did you feel moment by moment?’’), relative to
abstract, attributional thoughts (e.g., ‘‘Why did you feel this way?’’), lead to
faster recovery from a negative emotion (Moberly & Watkins, 2006;
Watkins, 2004). Concrete rather than abstract processing of emotional
experience also leads to global improvements in cognitive flexibility (Watkins
& Moulds, 2005), consistent with the person-oriented functions of this type
of emotion regulation.
Body. In regulating bodily expressions of emotion, person-oriented
emotion regulation seeks to forge a mutual exchange between higher mental
processes and peripherally mediated emotion responses. Throughout this
exchange, mind and body are equally important, and each system is allowed
to express its natural tendencies. It is noteworthy that meditation (Cahn &
Polich, 2006) and mindfulness training (Brown et al., 2007), which are often
regarded as attentional strategies of emotion regulation, typically include
bodily activities such as breathing and relaxation exercises. This dual focus
on mind and body fits with the holistic orientation of systematic emotion
regulation.
One bodily activity that may foster person-oriented emotion regulation
relies on the voluntary control of breath. Some forms of controlled breathing
may facilitate emotion regulation, in that specific breathing patterns are
associated with general mood and distinct emotions (Boiten, Frijda, &
Wientjes, 1994). Indeed, voluntarily engaging in specific breathing patterns
can selectively activate specific emotional states (Philippot, Chapelle, &
Blairy, 2002) and reduce emotional distress (Franck, Scha¨fer, Stiels,
Wasserman, & Hermann, 1994; Meuret, Wilhelm, & Roth, 2001). The
effects of controlled breathing involve both bottom-up processes, such as
respiratory feedback (Philippot et al., 2002), and top-down processes, given
that attention to one’s own respiratory rhythms enhances the emotion-
regulation effects of controlled breathing (Arch & Craske, 2006; Clark &
Hirschman, 1990; Zeier, 1984). This co-ordinated interplay of top-down and
bottom-up functions fits with the integrative aspects of person-oriented
emotion regulation.
Another bodily activity that may foster person-oriented emotion regula-
tion relies on muscle relaxation (Esch et al., 2003). Much research has used
Jacobson’s (1928) classic technique of progressive muscle relaxation. In this
technique, people successively tense and relax their muscle groups in
different parts of the body. Experimental studies have shown that progressive
muscle relaxation down-regulates state anxiety and perceived stress (Pawlow
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& Jones, 2002; Rankin, Gilner, Gfeller, & Katz, 1993; Rausch, Gramling, &
Auerbach, 2006). Progressive muscle relaxation further reduces heart rate
and salivary cortisol (Pawlow & Jones, 2002) and stress-related disease
(Carlson & Hoyle, 1993; Esch et al., 2003). Consistent with the involvement
of high-level processes in progressive muscle relaxation, the technique is
most effective when it is combined with attention to muscle sensations
(Borkovec & Hennings, 1978) or biofeedback (Lehrer, 1982).
Summary
Person-oriented strategies of emotion regulation promote the overall
functioning of the personality system. Some person-oriented emotion-
regulation strategies rely on counter-regulation, a process that directs
attention to information that is of opposite valence to people’s current
emotional state. Alternatively, person-oriented emotion regulation may foster
cognitive integration of unwanted emotional experiences, through activities
such as expressive writing. Over time, integration of emotional experiences
may give rise to an extensive autobiographical knowledge base, and accessing
this knowledge base may further stimulate person-oriented emotion regula-
tion. Bodily forms of person-oriented emotion regulation involve such
activities as controlled breathing and progressive muscle relaxation. Per-
son-oriented emotion regulation is associated with long-term benefits,
regardless of whether it targets attention, knowledge, or the body.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The present article has reviewed contemporary insights and findings on the
psychology of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation was defined as the set
of processes whereby people seek to redirect the spontaneous flow of their
emotions. In a broad sense, emotion regulation refers to the set of processes
whereby people manage all of their emotionally charged states, including
specific emotions, affect, mood, and stress. Emotion regulation determines
how easily people can leave a given emotional state. It can thus be
distinguished from emotional sensitivity, which determines how easily people
can enter an emotional state.
Presently, there exists no consensual and empirically validated taxonomy
of emotion-regulation strategies. Nevertheless, researchers have identified
several higher-order categories that could lay the foundation for such a
taxonomy. The most viable higher-order categories for classifying emotion-
regulation strategies are currently the emotion-generating systems that are
targeted in emotion regulation (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001) and the psychological
functions of emotion regulation. Among the chief targets of emotion
regulation are attention, cognitive emotion-relevant knowledge, and bodily
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manifestations of emotion. Among the major psychological functions of
emotion regulation are the satisfaction of hedonic needs, supporting goal
pursuits, and maintenance of the global personality system.
A dual classification in terms of targets and functions was found to be
helpful in organising the literature on emotion-regulation strategies. Need-
oriented emotion regulation includes strategies of: (a) turning attention away
from negative information or towards positive information; (b) interpreta-
tive biases; and (c) bodily activities such as binge eating or smoking. Goal-
oriented emotion regulation includes strategies of: (a) distraction through
cognitive load; (b) cognitive reappraisal; and (c) bodily activities such as
expressive suppression, response exaggeration, and venting. Finally, person-
oriented emotion regulation includes strategies of: (a) attentional counter-
regulation; (b) cognitive activities such as expressive writing or accessing
autobiographical memories; and (c) bodily activities such as controlled
breathing and progressive muscle relaxation. There is consistent empirical
support for each of these strategies, though more work remains necessary to
fully understand their underlying processes.
The hypothesis that cognitive strategies are more effective than bodily
strategies of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998a,b, 2001) was only partly
supported. With respect to goal-oriented emotion regulation, attentional
and reappraisal strategies indeed appear to have an edge over bodily
strategies such as expressive suppression or venting. However, the picture is
different with respect to need- and person-oriented emotion regulation. In
the domain of need-oriented emotion regulation, cognitive strategies appear
to be relatively ineffective, especially in the long run. For instance,
attentional avoidance of threatening information among repressors is
associated with intrusive thoughts and poor health outcomes (Geraerts et
al., 2006; Myers, 2000). Conversely, in the domain of person-oriented
emotion regulation, bodily strategies appear to be relatively effective. For
instance, progressive muscle relaxation effectively down-regulates stress and
stress-related disease (Pawlow & Jones, 2002; Esch et al., 2003). Taken
together, the advantage of cognitive over bodily strategies of emotion
regulation appears to be specific to goal-oriented emotion regulation and
does not apply across all known emotion-regulation strategies.
Because emotions are fundamentally embodied (Niedenthal, 2007), all
emotion-regulation processes must ultimately interface with bodily functions.
Nevertheless, only few studies to date have systematically addressed the
physiology of emotion regulation. One intriguing line of work suggests an
important role for cardiac vagal tone in emotion regulation (Appelhans &
Luecken, 2006; Porges, 2007; Thayer & Lane, 2000, 2007). The vagal nerve
may function as an active brake on heart rate that puts the individual into a
calm emotional state. In emotion regulation, vagal tone may be dynamically
controlled in a top-down manner by cortical systems (Porges, Doussard-
30 KOOLE
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
07
:5
9 
25
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
Roosevelt, & Maita, 1994; Thayer & Lane, 2000, 2007). Identifying mechan-
isms such as vagal tone will be of key significance in relating the physiology of
emotion regulation to its cognitive and neurological manifestations.
At a general level, the present article attests to the considerable growth
and vitality of modern research on emotion regulation. There is good reason
to believe that emotion regulation research will continue to flourish, given
the growing recognition that emotion regulation plays a major role in
physical and psychological well-being, combined with the development of
ever more powerful methods of investigation. One particularly exciting set of
recent discoveries has been that emotion-regulatory competencies are
susceptible to social learning experiences (see also Butler et al., 2007).
Indeed, emotion-regulatory competencies may be improved through directed
exercises (Brown et al., 2007; Dandeneau et al., 2007; Serrano, Latorre,
Gatz, & Montan˜e´s, 2004) and may continue to develop even into old age
(Carstensen et al., 2003). Studying the social-cognitive processes that allow
people to improve their competencies in emotion regulation is likely to
generate important new insights into the nature of emotion regulation.
Moreover, such investigations may eventually lead to better interventions for
improving emotion-regulatory competencies.
Some might fear that boosting people’s capacity for emotion regulation will
inevitably narrow emotional experience. In fact, research suggests just the
opposite. Drawing from Chinese poetics and Confucian philosophy, Frijda
and Sundararajan (2007) described how emotional restraint contributes to a
deeper and more differentiated appreciation of one’s emotions. In line with
this, empirical evidence indicates that individuals with high emotion-regula-
tion competencies are characterised by greater self-reflexivity and a more
profound awareness of their emotions (Barrett et al., 2001; Brown et al., 2007).
People’s emotional lives are thus likely to become enriched as people learn new
and more powerful ways of regulating their emotions.
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